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Abstract The age of Internet of Things (IoT) has brought in new challenges 
specifically in areas such as security. The evolution of classic power grids to 
smart grids is a prime example of how everything is now being connected to the 
Internet. With the power grid becoming smart, the information and 
communication systems supporting it is subject to both classical and emerging 
cyber-attacks. The article investigates the vulnerabilities caused by distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on the smart grid advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI). Attack simulations have been conducted on a realistic 
electrical grid topology. The simulated network consisted of smart meters, 
power plant and utility servers. Finally, the impact of large scale DDoS attacks 
on the distribution system’s reliability is discussed. 
Keywords advanced metering infrastructure (AMI); distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS); smart grid; smart meter 
1   Introduction 
In 2011 McAfee reported over 60% of critical infrastructure companies regularly 
found malware designed to attack their systems. Smart grid is arguably the most 
fundamental cyber-physical infrastructures of the humankind and modern society. 
Smart grid and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) or commonly known as the 
smart meter are considered as the main signs of classical electrical grids evolution 
toward smarter grids. The new grids promises to improve energy efficiency and 
reliability by incorporating information communication technologies (ICT), 
renewable energy generation, new transmission and distribution technologies, 
increased levels of automation and control, and Internet of Things (IoT) technologies 
consisting  of sensors/actuators, sensor networks, analytics, data, and information.  
It is expected that smart meters would be rolled-out worldwide in the next decade. For 
example, in the US it is expected that 60 million smart meters would be installed by 
2015 and the UK government has plans to roll-out smart meters in every home by 
2020. By replacing classical electric meters with smart meters, a wide range of 
functionalities can be provided to the customers, energy providers and third parties. 
These functionalities include billing, monitoring, controlling, predicting and planning 
energy usage and production. In a power plant, energy usage data is required to meet 
the energy demands, smart meters help realize this in a cost-efficient manner.  
Smart grid deployments are very data intensive, from one way meter reading to 
demand response to real time pricing application, the data exchange between the utility 
center and the household should be properly engineered and most importantly secured 
[1]. Electrical grids are considered as national critical infrastructures as they play a 
vital role in modern society. The failure of a grid can incur huge losses leading to 
catastrophe. The wide application of ICT for smart grid has created a massive 
dependence on its information infrastructure, introducing new kinds of vulnerabilities 
in the power network [2]: 
 Data theft and manipulation: The energy usage readings and other sensitive 
customer information provided by the smart meter is at risk of being 
manipulated or being accessed by unauthorized parties. 
 Information and communication infrastructure: The smart meters are 
connected to the Internet to provide data to energy providers and customers. 
As a result of this the smart grid is prone to traditional attacks on hardware, 
software and protocols. 
Cyber-security for critical infrastructure such as smart grid is a very concerning issue 
because of emerging cyber-threats and security incidents targeting critical 
infrastructures all over the world.  This article deals with analyzing the vulnerabilities 
introduced in the smart grid due to the IT nature of smart meters. Generally cyber-
attacks in electrical grids can be categorized under three categories [3]: 
 Attack on the hardware: such as change value in automation devices, remote 
terminal unit (RTU) and human-machine interface (HMI). 
 Attack on software: such as exploiting vulnerabilities in commonly used 
DNP3 and Modbus protocols. 
 Attack on network topology: exploiting network topology vulnerability, such 
as denial-of-service (DoS) attack, overflowing an RTU with protocol 
messages, etc. 
These cyber-attacks are based on the exploitation of vulnerabilities present in the 
underlying computer and networking technologies. The attack on smart grids dealt 
with in this article exploits the vulnerabilities in the present Internet infrastructure. A 
person, group or customer with malicious intents can attack a network through a 
number of actions, one of which is distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. DDoS 
attack exploits numerous attack sources, spread using multiple hosts to launch a 
coordinated DoS attack against one or more targets which effectively amplifies the 
attack power and makes defense more complicated. It is estimated that malicious 
hackers launch more than 7,000 DDoS attacks each day. 
The aim of the article is to study the impact of large-scale DDoS attack on the 
information and communication infrastructure of smart grid AMI network through a 
network simulation tool called NeSSi 
2 
[4].  
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section II, we investigate related 
work and give some background information. In section III we describe the simulation 
setup. Section IV discusses the simulation results and discussion. Finally, the 
conclusion is presented  in Section V to summarize the work. 
2   Related Work 
According to [5] a recent worldwide poll found that the cyber-attacks increasingly 
pose a threat to national energy and communication systems. Cyber-security must 
address not only deliberate attacks, for example from disgruntled employees, 
industrial espionages, and terrorists, but also accidental compromises of the cyber 
infrastructure due to user negligence, user errors, equipment failure, and natural 
disasters. Vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to penetrate a system, get access to a 
control center, and modify load conditions to destabilize a critical infrastructure in 
unpredictable ways leading to serious results, for example brownout or even 
catastrophic blackout [6]. In addition, cyber-security issues may also result in a 
breach of customer privacy and unpredicted economic losses in the electricity market.  
A lot of research work has been carried on smart grids and their security. This section 
covers a few of those.  
2.1   Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
Currently, there is no standardized process for the smart grid. Work done in [7] and 
[8] focuses at a global level whereas [2] is primarily based on the current standards in 
Germany (Europe). For the ease of understanding, we have put forth a simple 
overview of the smart metering infrastructure in Fig. 1 that will be used in the study. 
 
 Fig. 1. Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
 Smart Meter: It is an electronic device with estimated lifetime of several 
decades which records consumption of electric energy in regular intervals of 
time and communicates that information back to the utility. Smart meters are 
different from conventional electric meters, they enable two-way 
communication between the meter and the utility server. Smart meters gather 
data for remote reporting (on-demand and periodic), which is used by the 
utility server for billing and consumption monitoring purposes. 
 Utility Server: The utility server is housed in the control center. It is in direct 
communication with the source of generation as well as the consumption 
units. The server feeds the power generator and the user with live 
consumption data. This data is finally used at the site of generation to keep 
track of the energy requirements and by the energy providers for billing. 
There are no speciﬁcations available for the utility server, only the interfaces 
are speciﬁed. The protocols which are used for this are Smart Message 
Language (SML) for connecting the utility server with Multi Utility 
communication (MUC) and EDIFACT/MSCONS for billing [2]. 
2.2   Smart Grid Security 
“Where roll-out of smart meters is assessed positively, at least 80% of consumers 
shall be equipped with intelligent metering systems by 2020” [9]. With the European 
Parliament preparing to install smart meters in every home, it becomes even more 
important that the security of the smart grid is up to the mark.  
 
The most serious threats related to the privacy deterioration of smart grid consumers 
include [10]:  
 Cyber-attack and intrusion 
 Identity theft 
 Tracking and observing the behavioral patterns of the consumers and the 
appliances being used 
 Real time spying and surveillance  
A recent study by Baker et al. highlighted that nearly 80% of electrical enterprises in 
14 countries were victims of large-scale DDoS attacks [11]. Nearly 25 percent of the 
executives who were part of the study reported extortion through threatened or 
realized cyber-attacks. This was a 20 percent increase as compared to the year before. 
Smart meters will be deployed on a large-scale in a short time and the study 
emphasizes the critical issue regarding the security of such systems. 
Several schemes have been proposed to implement smart grid privacy, some of the 
schemes are: Anonymous Credential, 3
rd
 Party Escrow Architecture, Load Signature 
Moderation (LSM), ElecPrivacy, Smart Energy Gateway (SEG) and Privacy 
preserving Authentication [12]. The study in [13] focused on comparing these 
proposed approaches and architectures aimed at protecting the privacy of smart grid 
users.  
2.3   Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack 
In this article we will look at one of the conventional cyber-attacks: distributed denial- 
of-service (DDoS). In contrast to a classic DoS attack that uses a single attack source, 
DDoS attacks exploit numerous attack sources, spread using multiple hosts, which 
effectively amplifies the attack power and makes defense more complicated.  
The attack on smart grids dealt with in this article exploits the vulnerabilities in the 
present Internet infrastructure design which focuses on how to effectively move 
packets from the source to the destination, malicious or not.  The design follows the 
end-to-end paradigm: the intermediate network provides the best-effort packet 
forwarding service. The end-to-end paradigm pushes the complexity to end hosts, 
leaving the intermediate network simple and optimized for packet forwarding. The 
Internet is not design to police traffic. If one party in two-way communication (source 
or destination) misbehaves, it can do arbitrary damage to its peer [14]. 
A typical DDoS attack is externally engineered with an objective to bring down a large 
portion or even the whole targeted network. One essential issue of DDoS attack and 
defense is resource competition; if a defender has sufficient resources to counter a 
DDoS attack, then the attack will be unsuccessful, and vice versa. Recent researches 
[15] have corrected a long held belief that hackers can easily compromise as many 
computers as they want. Due to the anti-virus and anti-malware efforts and software, 
the number of active bots a bot-master can manipulate is constrained to hundreds or a 
few thousand, even though the number of bot footprints may be much larger. 
DDoS attacks can be categorized into two groups: flooding attacks and vulnerability 
attacks [16].  
Flooding attacks: SYN flooding [17] and Internet control message protocol (ICMP) 
flooding are the two of the most popular DDoS flooding attacks.  SYN flooding 
exploits the weaknesses in the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). SYN packet in 
TCP is required to establish a connection between any two hosts. It is a request sent 
by the host to make a connection. Attackers send SYN packets to the ports that are in 
the 'Listening' state in the target host, these packets have a source address that does 
not represent the actual host. The target responds with a SYN or ACK packet 
addressed to the source address in the SYN packet that was received. As the system 
does not exist and the source address was invalid, the target keeps waiting for a 
packet acknowledgment to complete the connection process. The allocation of 
resources by the target in response to these malicious packets leads to a DDoS attack. 
ICMP flooding exploits configuration errors on the involved network devices 
involved. It lets packets to be sent to a network via broadcast address, which were to 
be sent to a specific host. The attacker sends a large number of IP packets with an 
invalid source address. This leads to network bandwidth drainage, causing legitimate 
packets to be blocked. There is also UDP (User Datagram Protocol) flood attack 
which exploits the connectionless TCP/IP stack protocol to generate a DDoS attack. 
Using UDP for DoS attacks is not as straightforward as with TCP. A UDP flood 
attack can be initiated by sending a large number of UDP packets to random ports on 
a destination host and forcing the destination host to send a large number of ICMP 
packets. 
Vulnerability attacks: In this attack, malicious packets exploit network protocol or 
application fault that exists at the target network. The malicious packets exploit 
vulnerable software installed at the target hosts, triggering excessive CPU utilization, 
increasing memory demand, halting the hosts’ operation, or other general system 
braking [16]. Vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to penetrate a system, get access 
to a control center, and modify load conditions to destabilize a critical infrastructure 
in unpredictable ways leading to serious results or disaster, for example brownout or 
even catastrophic blackout [6]. The vulnerability attack can be usually mitigated by 
implementing regular patching. 
In reality, DDoS attack is easily performed by open-source DDoS attack tools such as 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) or High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC). LOIC had been 
one of the favorite DDoS tools used by Anonymous and other hacker groups. LOIC 
sends out multiple simultaneous requests for a web page that is unlikely to exist on 
the target site. It floods the server with TCP or UDP packets with the intention of 
disrupting the service of a particular host. Attackers often use Twitter to co-ordinate 
its DDoS attacks. Due to its popularity, LOIC has been ported to Java and Web based 
versions. HOIC is considered as an upgraded version of LOIC, it sends high-speed 
multi-threaded HTTP flood that is able to flood up to 256 websites at once 
simultaneously. To prevent firewall detection, HOIC targets sub-pages, sends 
multiple fake users requests to multiple pages within a domain, the welcome pages, 
the help pages, and anything else a target site has to offer. It is reported that as little as 
30-50 attackers equipped with HOIC can cause a significant damage to the target 
website. 
2.4   NeSSi
2
  
NeSSi
2
 is an agent-based simulation environment that provides telecommunication 
network simulation capabilities with an extensive support to evaluate security 
solutions such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System) [4]. In contrast to other popular 
network simulators, such as ns-2 [18], ns-3 [19] or OMNeT++ [20], NeSSi
2
 provides a 
comprehensive detection application programming interface (API) for the integration 
and evaluation of IDS. Special attack scenarios are relatively easy to simulate and 
study using NeSSi
2
. NeSSi
2 
also provides methods to simulate smart grid networks by 
supporting both IP and energy networks.  
NeSSi
2
 is built upon the JIAC (Java-based Intelligent Agent Component ware) 
framework [21], a service centric agent-framework. All entities, i.e. both IP and 
energy based are simulated using JIAC agents. Depending on the conﬁguration and 
the hardware characteristics, each agent simulates one or more nodes (IP/Energy 
entities).  
3   Simulation Design 
To evaluate and analyze the effect of a DDoS attack on the smart grid we setup a 
simulation scenario using NeSSi
2
.  
In our simulation scenario, we simulate a UDP (User Datagram Protocol) storm 
DDoS attack. We use multiple hosts to send a large number of UDP packets to 
random ports on a destination host. As a result, the destination host will: 
 Check for the application listening at that port; 
 See that no application listens at that port; 
 Reply with an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet. 
Thus, for a large number of UDP packets, the victimized system will be forced into 
sending a large number of ICMP packets, eventually leading it to be unreachable by 
other clients. The attacker may also spoof the IP address of the UDP packets, ensuring 
that the excessive ICMP return packets do not reach them, and anonymizing their 
network location(s).  
In order to mimic a real smart grid environment undergoing a UDP storm attack, we 
need to federate both IP network and energy network. The topology for both networks 
is as follows:  
 
Energy Network: To make the energy network topology replicate a real life energy 
network we have taken an open ring topology as it is commonly deployed in larger 
cities like Glasgow or Berlin [2]. In this topology when there is a fault, the defective 
part can be isolated by using switches [2]. The network consists of five low voltage 
sub networks of 1kV each. Each subnet has an open ring topology as shown in Fig 2.  
 
Fig. 2. Energy subnet for smart grid with open ring topology 
 
Each subnet consists of 10 households with the application Smart Home Consumer 
running on each house. A total of 50 houses which are simulating energy demands for 
250 people in the winter are used. This is done to keep a balance between granularity 
and the network size. The source of energy is a wind farm running a wind farm 
application, which is a common scenario for a country like Scotland. Compared to 
other renewable energy sources, wind energy has clear advantages such as being   
environment friendly, causing no pollution and having a minimal environmental 
impact. It is also the most mature and the most utility-scale ready alternative from all 
the renewable energy solutions [22]. In our simulation, the external supply connecting 
the source of energy and the subnets utilizes a swing bus and line failure application 
to analyze the power mismatch between production and consumption and simulate the 
effects of the attack on the energy network.  
IP Network: The IP network is similar to the energy network. As depicted in Fig 3, it 
consists of five sub-networks with 10 clients in each to simulate the 
telecommunication part of the smart grid. Each client is mapped to a consumer entity 
in the energy network. All the five subnets are connected to the utility server, which is 
responsible for the collection of data from the clients. The utility server is connected 
to the Internet for billing purposes and is mapped to the power plant. To demonstrate 
the attack on the utility server, it is connected to a bot network (botnet) (see Fig. 4.) 
which consists of bots, i.e. devices which are used by an attacker for malicious 
activity. Botnets are often used as the tools to perform DDoS attacks due to the 
anonymity it provides the attacker as well as the ability to achieve high volumes of 
traffic with minimal commands being sent. As defined by [4], a botnet is, “a 
collection of software robots, or bots, which run autonomously and automatically. 
They run on groups of zombie computers controlled remotely by attackers.”  
These “bots” are a source of “capability” that aids an attacker in his or her endeavor 
to perform malicious activity. Recently large-scale DDoS attacks are carried out using 
botnets controlled by a bot-master via command-and-control (C&C) channels. The 
bots are then programmed and instructed by the bot-master to perform a variety of 
cyber-attacks, including DDoS attacks. 
In our simulation the IP network used three different profiles: 
1) Client: It is used to model the behavior of a smart meter. Runs applications 
such as echo client, targeted UDP client application and energy-based IP 
device failure application.  
 
2) Server: Utilizes the echo server and IP device failure applications.  
 
3) Bot: To simulate the attack, all the bots are loaded with the DDoS application. 
Distributed UDP storm attack is implemented. 
 
Fig. 3. IP Network topology 
 
 Fig. 4. Bot Network 
4   Results and Discussion 
The federated simulation was run for a duration of 1000 ticks (tick is the term for the 
atomic discrete time unit [4]). The statistics for the utility server and the clients are 
shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively. In Fig. 5, we can see a sudden surge in the 
number of packets being forwarded to the server at tick 300, signaling a DDoS attack. 
When the attack continues, the server goes down at tick 500 and starts dropping all 
incoming packets (see Fig. 5). In the simulation, the Bot network is designed such that 
it starts flooding the target server with UDP packets at tick 300. After multiple 
simulation taking different simulation parameters we found that at tick 500, the server 
was flooded with enough UDP packets, activating the IP device failure app and 
eventually bringing down the server. 
Simulation parameters in the DDoS attack simulation scenario are summarized in 
Table 1 
Table 1.  Simulation parameters  
Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Number of Botnets 1 
Number of Bots 33 
Number of Smart meters 50 
Number of Houses 50 
Number of Wind farms 1 
Simulation duration (Number of Ticks) 1000 
 Fig. 5. Packet statistics for the utility server 
 
Fig. 6. Packet statistics for each client 
 
On the energy network, the energy produced by the power plant is equal to the 
demand of the electric grid. However, with the failure of the utility server, the power 
plant has no usage data as a result of which the power plant stops producing 
electricity.  
In the simulation scenario, the Line failure application is used to mimic this. Thus the 
whole network is brought down with the energy production and the load at the power 
plant and the houses falling to zero (see Fig. 7 and Fig. 8).  
The failure of the energy meter at the houses causes the IP based clients to start 
dropping packets and seize communication with the utility server (see Fig. 6). It is 
simulated using the Energy based IP device failure app. This application drops all 
packets if the voltage of the federated energy device is zero. 
In our scenario, the Bot network stopped flooding the server with UDP packets at tick 
750. The server is restored, almost immediately as well as the energy network (see 
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8). As can be seen in Fig.7, the energy demand immediately after the 
power outage was quite high (around 19kWatts).  
An interesting observation in this simulated DDoS attack is that the energy network 
was not affected during the DDoS attack. The energy network was only affected after 
the server is down due to the smart grid being brought down. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Load for each house (in Watts) 
 
 
Fig. 8. Power plant generation (in Watts) 
5   Summary 
Electrical power grids are valuable infrastructures and their integration with ICT will 
play a fundamental role to meet future energy goals and effectively manage the 
phenomenal demand and supply of electricity. The article investigated large scale 
DDoS attack on smart grid AMI network, motivated by a significant increase in 
cyber-attacks to national critical infrastructure. 
The impact of DDoS attack on critical infrastructure availability has been simulated 
and evaluated. It is clear from the simulation results that the smart grid is highly 
vulnerable to various types of cyber-attacks, such as DDoS. The simulation results 
using NeSSi
2 
show how the whole electrical grid system was successfully brought 
down by the simulated large-scale DDoS attack. The wide application of ICT for 
smart grid has created a massive dependence on its information infrastructure, 
introducing new kinds of vulnerabilities in the power network. The failure of a grid 
can incur huge losses leading to catastrophe. In case, the smart grid covers critical 
infrastructure such as an air traffic control center, the effects can be disastrous. With 
the transformation of the conventional electric grid to a smarter one, steps need to be 
taken to ensure security is properly planned and in place to ensure a smooth working 
of the electrical power systems. Future work should focus on how to mitigate and 
prevent similar cyber-attacks, such as DDoS attacks by applying some mechanism, 
such as intrusion detection and prevention systems within the above smart grid 
simulation environment. 
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